Presenting evidence from a 19 th century corporation, the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company (C&O), the paper shows that issues of corporate governance have existed since the first corporations were established in the United States. The C&O used a stockholder committee to review the annual report of the president and directors. The paper shows how the C&O stockholders used this committee to supplement the corporate governance structure. The corporate governance structure of the C&O is also viewed from the theoretical structure as espoused by Hart (1995) .
Introduction
In their discussion of corporate governance, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) try to answer the question of why investors part with their money despite evidence and theory that company managers have discretion over the use of these funds and that managers have incentives to act in their own best interests at the investors expense. Shleifer and Vishny state that investors, in order to protect themselves, have put in place corporate governance structures.
The corporate governance structure of modern corporations consists of stockholders, board of directors, management, and independent auditors. Stockholders elect the board of directors and the board of directors hires and monitors management and the independent auditors. Independent auditors examine the stockholders financial interest. This system is being rethought due to recent corporate failures (e.g., Enron, Worldcom, Adelphia). While these corporate failures have diverse consequences and details, some failures can be related back to a corporate governance failure. Hart (1995) provides a theoretical framework for corporate governance, and he describes the agency problem and how corporate governance relates. He further illustrates why companies will write incomplete agent contracts. Hart states that if the agency problem exists and contracts are incomplete then the structure of corporate governance has a role and is important. Five of the issues of corporate governance raised by Hart are:
• The cost of agent contracts.
• Individual stockholders are too numerous to exercise control on a day-to-day basis, so control is delegated.
• Large stockholders.
• The limitations of the corporate board of directors.
• The potential that management will pursue their own goals at the stockholders expense. Because of these issues, providers of capital have designed systems of corporate governance with checks and balances to protect their financial interests in the corporation.
With methods of corporate governance and the success of those methods today being questioned, this paper reviews corporate governance from a historical perspective. While several studies (Charkham 1994; Roe 1993 ) have compared corporate governance methods between countries, few have looked at corporate governance in history (Gallhofer and Haslam 1993) . This paper provides evidence that many of the current issues of corporate governance existed in a 19 th century corporation. The paper further illustrates how the issues raised by Hart are not new, but have been related to corporate governance since the first corporations were chartered in the United States by providing evidence from the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company (C&O). The paper also presents information about how the C&O addressed these issues of corporate governance.
The following section provides background information on the origins of the corporate governance structure and general practices of the C&O. Actions taken by the stockholders to oversee control of the company and its finances are then presented followed by a discussion regarding the stockholder audit of financial reporting of the company. The final section provides some concluding comments.
Background Information
In the fall of 1783 George Washington resigned his commission as commander and chief of the revolutionary army. On September 2, 1784, he started a tour of the western territories. The purpose of his trip was to examine his land holdings and to determine the feasibility of waterway improvements between the coastal region of the country and the Ohio valley. Washington communicated to Virginia governor Benjamin Harrison on October 10, 1784 stating the need for improved communication and transportation with the western territories. From this letter was born the canal movement in the United States.
1 Over the next three months, Washington traveled between Mount Vernon, Annapolis and Richmond to obtain the charter for a corporation, The Potomac Company.
The Potomac Company made improvements to navigation on the Potomac River. The improvements prosecuted by the Potomac Company were removing obstructions and building lock systems around major obstacles such as the great falls just up river from Georgetown. However, by 1820 the Potomac Company had exhausted its finances. The navigational improvements prosecuted by the Potomac Company also proved to be inadequate for the region and country needs. In 1823, a new group of individuals obtained a charter from Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania and the federal government to form a new company. The new company, the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company, absorbed the assets, liabilities and stockholders from the Potomac Company. The goal of the new company was to build an artificial river (canal) from tidewater Potomac to the Ohio River at Pittsburgh.
The 1784 charter of the Potomac Company required an annual meeting of the stockholders. The charter also stated that at the annual meeting the "president and directors shall make report, and render distinct and just accounts of all their proceedings, and on finding them fairly and justly stated, the proprietors then present, or a majority of them, shall give a certificate thereof" [1784 Va. Acts ch. XLIII (Hen.)]. To accomplish this charter requirement at each annual meeting the stockholders of the Potomac Company selected a committee to review the annual report of the company.
The charter of the C&O was almost identical to the Potomac Company charter, including the above referenced phrase. In addition to absorbing the stockholders of the Potomac Company the C&O also acquired many of the practices of the Potomac Company, including the corporate governance structure.
Actions by Stockholders to Effect Control
The C&O continued the practice started by the Potomac Company of having a committee review the annual report presented by the company president and report back to the stockholders on their findings. A separate sub-committee was created to review (audit) the annual financial statements presented to the stockholders. At the 1831 annual stockholders meeting, a resolution was passed to create the stockholder review committee at the current meeting to review next year's annual report. The resolution also states that the president and directors should have the annual report prepared two weeks prior to the annual meeting to allow the committee to review the report before the stockholders meeting. After completing the canal to Cumberland, Maryland in 1850 the review process was again modified.
2 A committee of three or four stockholders present at the current stockholders meeting would be selected to review the next year's annual report; replacing the committee/sub-committee structure previously employed. The committee's main focus during these years was the examination of the financial records of the company. Additionally, other committees would be established as the stockholders felt necessary to examine particular issues of interest to the stockholders. 3 The annual review committee reports presented in the stockholder minute books provide insight into the functionality of the company's corporate governance structure. Hart's (1995) theoretical framework provides some weaknesses of corporate governance structures. Hart states why the corporate governance structure is important and why there are weaknesses in the corporate governance structure. Stated earlier were five issues raised in the Hart paper. The following discussion describes these five issues and how they are illustrated in the C&O.
The Cost of Agent Contracts
The costs of writing a comprehensive agent contract are such that organizations will only write incomplete contracts (Hart 1995; Shleifer and Vishny 1997) . Hart (1995) states that one cost is thinking of every potential eventuality. In the case of the C&O it was not possible to think of every possibility, since the stockholders of the C&O were entering an unknown area. The C&O did not have a written contract with the corporate president; the company presidents were elected annually at the stockholders meetings. The stockholders imposed controls on the company management by passing stockholder resolutions. This can be illustrated by the changes occurring during the tenure of A.P. Gorman's C&O presidency. Gorman was president of the C&O from 1873 to 1883. During Gorman's tenure, a corporate bondholder brought a lawsuit against the company for non-payment of bond interest. In the lawsuit the plaintiff alleged corporate mismanagement as the reason for the non-payment. The court, while not agreeing to place the company into receivership as requested by the plaintiffs, did agree that the company was spending extravagantly on travel and entertainment expenses. In 1879, the stockholders passed a resolution limiting the travel reimbursement expenses of the officers and directors of the company. Hart (1995) further states "governance structure can be seen as a mechanism for making decisions that have not been specified in the initial contract" (p. 680). While the stockholder committee did not identify the issue of excessive travel and entertainment expenses, the stockholders of the C&O acted to correct the issue of travel and entertainment expenses by setting limits on the amount of the expenditures allowable.
Individual stockholders are too numerous to effect individual control
The authors of the C&O charter attempted to protect small investors by including voting restrictions. These restrictions were one vote per share for the first ten shares held, and one vote per every five shares above ten. In 1836, the State of Maryland purchased enough shares of stock to control over 50% of the voting rights (Sanderlin 1946) . Subsequent to the State of Maryland acquiring a controlling interest, the president and board of directors changed with every change in the political party of the state governor. In 1841 the stockholders, recognizing the costs of continuous changes in company management, pass a resolution stating that the C&O is a national work and should not become a political engine and fluctuate with the tide of the party (Stockholder minute book, Volume B, 414).
In spite of this resolution, by the 1870s the offices of the company had become political perks. Arthur Gorman was appointed president of the company in 1873 as a reward for services rendered the democratic party (Sanderlin 1947) . The year Gorman is nominated as president of the company, the State of Maryland votes for Gorman and all the other votes are cast for another slate of officers, Gorman is elected. Hart (1995) states that when company management is sufficiently bad, dissident shareholders can initiate a proxy fight to remove the board but unfortunately this is not a very powerful tool. In the case of the C&O, it was impossible for the minority stockholders to bring about change in the company.
The minority stockholders also made attempts to gain more influence on the company. At the June 1879 annual meeting, the individual representing the stock held by the United States government presented a motion to change the method of electing members of the board of directors. The motion was that the board of directors should consist of three members elected by the State of Maryland and two members elected by the minority stockholders. This resolution was defeated. The State of Maryland voted against the resolution and all other stockholders voted for the resolution.
Corporate bondholders also recognized the limitations caused by the political nature of the company. In 1881, the bondholders present a petition at the stockholders meeting that makes the following statement:
That they (the bondholders) have received no payments on account thereof since December 1876. That they believe if the canal is managed on business principles, free from political influences, it can and will pay the debts due to them.
That they believe it is now and has been for years too much controlled and managed as a political machine for the purposes of promoting the interest of party without proper regard to those of the State of Maryland, who is the largest creditor or of the bondholders (Stockholder minute book, Volume E, 336-337). O'Sullivan (2000) commenting on innovative organizations and corporate governance states that "a system of corporate governance supports innovation by generating three conditions -financial commitment, organizational integration and insider control" (p. 410). Financial commitment is defined as an institution's commitment to continue financial support of the innovative process. Organizational integration is maintaining of human capital. Once an innovative process has started the loss of human capital will cost the organization additional resources. Insider control requires that the decision makers are involved in the learning/innovation process. The stockholders of the C&O were aware of the problems of continuously changing company officers. However, the minority stockholders were unable to exert enough control to force a change in the policy. The officers of the company changed with the political party in power in the Maryland statehouse. At the April 1841 stockholders meeting, the review committee makes the following statement:
The committee, from evidence given them, are satisfied that very valuable and faithful officers have been removed from the service of the company, and, in some cases, men not competent to perform the duties required have been appointed in their places, to the serious injury of the best interest of the company.
Some of these removals have been as admitted by the president's report to the governor of Maryland, for political opinions sake which, as your committee conceive, no direct interest of the company either required or demanded.
In addition to these views already presented, there are other matters which might be adverted to if the time allowed for this report would permit, which go strongly to induce this committee to believe that the affairs of the canal company have been most unfortunately managed (Stockholder minute book, Volume B, 417-418). The stockholders of the C&O were numerous with large blocks of stock held by the United States Government, the State of Virginia, and the cities of Alexandria and Georgetown. Even with these large blocks of stock, the holders working together were still unable to effect changes in the corporate management when it was deemed necessary.
Large Stockholders
In the presence of large shareholders the agency problems may be reduced but not eliminated. Large shareholders will under perform the monitoring and intervention activities and may use its voting power to improve its own position at the expense of the other shareholders (Hart 1995; Shleifer and Vishny 1997) . In the case of the C&O, this is illustrated by the action of the State of Maryland. Information regarding a large stockholder working for selfish reasons is also illustrated in the C&O.
In 1841, the State of Maryland legislature passed a bill to provide the additional funding requested by the company for completion of the canal. Before the funding was to be made available to the company the company stockholders had to ratify the provisions of the Maryland bill. When a resolution was presented for a vote at the stockholders meeting, the State of Maryland votes for the resolution and all other stockholders vote against the resolution. The bill that passed included a clause that was objected to by stockholders. This section of the Maryland bill stated that the state attorney general was to begin proceedings against the company for failure to pay interest on previously loaned money. Since the previous loan included a mortgage of corporate assets, the stockholders were afraid that the state would foreclose on the company and leave them with nothing. The state ended up lending the company the money without taking legal action to collect past due amounts.
The State of Maryland used its voting power to further its own agenda. The state passed the 1841 financing bill with the dual purpose of finishing the canal and to take over the canal. The state also used the company to further political ambitions and agendas as indicated in the previous section of the paper.
Limitations of the Board of Directors
Stockholders elect a board of directors to monitor corporate management. In his discussion of a board of directors, Hart (1995) lists four shortcomings of the board as a monitoring device.
The first limitation is that some board members are corporate officers and that selfmonitoring in not effective. The C&O did not have corporate officers as board members so there is no illustrative evidence of this issue to be presented.
The second limitation is that board members may not have a financial interest in the company and therefore have little to gain by the success of the company. In the beginning the C&O board was populated by stockholders. All of these individuals had a vested financial interest in the success of the company. After the State of Maryland acquires voting control in 1836, board members are selected by the state for more political reasons. Most of these individuals had no financial interest in the company.
The third limitation is that board members are busy persons and have little time for company business affairs. In the 1800's when travel was more time consuming and difficult than today this problem was a greater issue. The board members were paid a salary and travel expenses (limited in 1879), but these were political gentlemen more interested in political gain than in financial gains.
The last limitation is that directors may owe their position to company management and are more loyal to management than to the stockholders that they are to protect. In the case of the C&O the directors and the company president were political appointees, selected as much for their political party association than for their business savvy. These individuals owed their allegiance to the company president far more than to the stockholders of the C&O.
All of these issues, in the case of the C&O, led to the company having a board of directors with little to gain by the company's success. It is apparent from archival evidence, that president Gorman used the company to further his own political future. He used the choice of persons hired and in the choices of letting contracts to gain favors with individuals needed to reach higher political office. After eight years as president of the C&O, Gorman was elected to the US senate representing the State of Maryland. The board of directors owed their allegiance to the political party more than to the C&O. For this reason, one could conclude that the board did not monitor the actions of the company president as closely as they perhaps should have monitored.
Potential that management will pursue their own goals
As stated earlier, president Gorman used the office of C&O president to further his political ambitions. Further evidence of such is that many board meetings during Gorman's tenure were held in Baltimore, Maryland. Baltimore was the home of the C&O's chief rival the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (B&O). The B&O was a rival for funding, route, and customers. Gorman spent company money on travel, hotels, and entertainment for himself and the C&O board members to have board meetings held in Baltimore. Gorman was not a Baltimore resident, the company offices were not in Baltimore and the city and residents of Baltimore had never supported the C&O canal; however Baltimore was a center of political power in the State of Maryland.
As illustrated in the previous discussion, the corporate governance issues presented by Hart (1995) existed in a 19 th century corporation. The discussion also shows how stockholders identified and addressed these issues as they manifested themselves in the C&O. This section illustrated that the agency problem existed.
Hart stated that in the presence of the agency problem and incomplete contracts, corporate governance matters. The C&O did not have a contract with the corporate president. Given the existence of the agency problem and the lack of a contract with the corporate president, then according to Hart corporate governance would matter. The next section of this paper explains how the C&O stockholders used a stockholder review committee to control the corporate officers and directors to reduce the problems presented by corporate governance limitations.
Stockholder Audit
As mentioned above, the C&O annually created a committee of stockholders to review the annual report of the president and directors. The Middlesex Canal of Massachusetts also used stockholders to perform the audit function (Kistler 1980) . In her article on the Middlesex Canal, Kistler states that the stockholders of that company appeared to have reviewed all transactions. However, Kistler also notes that the review performed in 1830 was completed in only one week. Kistler further states that the degree of thoroughness in completing the task is not stated. The information left by the Middlesex Canal Company does not provide any additional information on the thoroughness of the audit efforts. In contrast, the C&O review committee left detail information about the thoroughness of the audit efforts. The C&O committee recognized the limitations of auditing. In 1838, the committee reviewing the annual report made the following statement:
The committee have not (sic), of course, been able to examine the vouchers of all whom money has been paid during the year, because such an investigation would require much more time than was allowed them to devote to it; nor did it seem necessary, inasmuch as the requisitions had received the approbation and were authorized by the board of directors. They could do nothing more than look over the requisitions, or warrants, issued for disbursements, examine the books of the treasurer and clerk, and the vouchers for the expenditure of the contingent fund, etc. and these they have found to be correct and satisfactory (Stockholder minute book, Volume B, [176] [177] . For the year 1839, the committee making comments about estimated figures on the financial statements made this further illustration:
From these causes the statements may be found to require some variation but although not exact, the sub-committee are induced to believe, that they are at least proximately correct in the available basis that they exhibit for the demands of the current year (Stockholder minute book, Volume B, 291). This did not keep the sub-committee from admonishing the company officers when irregularities were encountered.
Over the life of the C&O, the stockholders reviewing the company finances made numerous observations and recommendations. The first recommendations for change came in 1834, when the review committee requested the following: 1) That requisitions for salaries and services state the time period the person was being paid for and the capacity in which the person had served the company. 2) That changes be made regarding the presentation of financial statements. For instance, previously the treasurer's report consisted of one statement showing total receipts and expenditures for the company to-date. The recommendation of the committee was to present a separate column for the current-year information. 3) That expenses for repairs be accounted for and reported separately from expenses for construction of the canal. 4) That a statement showing the amount of goods being transported on the canal be presented (Stockholder minute book, Volume A, 361-362). In 1839, the committee made the following observation:
The clerk's statement however shows other receipts to the amount of $11,175.58 arising from tolls, rents, etc. gathered by the several superintendents, which have been used and accounted for by them in disbursements in the service of the company; consequently these receipts have not passed through the books of the treasurer (Stockholder minute book, Volume B, 289).
The review committee asks that this process be terminated and that all receipts and expenditures be passed through (entered into) the treasurer's books. Stating that the practice of allowing superintendents to spend money without an accounting of the money in the company records "seems irregular and inconvenient."
Two stockholders meetings were held in 1841. At the April 1841 meeting, the stockholder committee admonishes the company with the following statement:
In one of the documents referred to by the president and directors, in their report of this day, there is a statement purporting to be a "statement of the debts & credits of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company on the first of January 1841," but this is admitted to be incorrect. It is therefore not to be relied upon.
The committee are therefore unable to present any satisfactory view on this point but will briefly state that as well as they can ascertain, in the absence of official statements, …(Stockholder minute book, Volume B, 415-416). The committee further stated that the company bylaws required that the company treasurer present financial reports at each monthly board meeting and that this has not been done since the current treasurer has been in office. The committee made further statements regarding individual transactions. The transactions referred to were related to the sale of bonds issued by the State of Maryland for stock subscriptions. The committee stated that the manner in which the sale was handled cost the company a substantial amount of money. As a result, the stockholders removed the company president, treasurer, and directors from office and replaced them with a new slate of corporate officers.
At the August 1841 stockholders meeting, the committee, after having reviewed the company records further, presented additional problems with the corporate records. The committee stated that several irregularities in vouchers were traced to a disregard of company policy by the former company president. The committee also states that during the five months leading up to the change in officers there were no accounting entries made in the company books.
In 1845, the review committee made the following observation about the company's method of bookkeeping and ask that it be changed: They find that under the directions given to the treasurer, and in accordance with the custom, which has heretofore prevailed in the company, payments have been made for more than one purpose on the same warrant and the whole payment charged under the head of the principal item for which the warrant was drawn.
In consequence of this circumstance the abstract of receipts into and payments from the treasury instead of exhibiting the actual condition of the affairs of the company in its items as well as in its final balances, only show the amount charged in the treasurers books under each head in the abstract instead of the whole amount of expenses properly chargeable under that head. Thus under the head of pay of lockkeepers, it appears by abstract that the amount paid in 1845 was $627, whereas by reference to the accounts of the company it is found that the whole amount properly chargeable under this head is $7,801.00 (Stockholder minute book, Volume C, 488-489). The final committee admonishment comes in 1857. The review committee disagrees with the changes in the organization of the company office staff. A new slate of officers was elected the prior year and reestablished the former office organization. The committee states that they are grateful to see the former organization restored.
After the canal construction was completed to Cumberland, Maryland in 1850, the review committee was less involved in reviewing the actions of the president and directors and more involved in the review of the company finances. Subsequent to 1857, the review committee makes no further admonishing remarks about the company operations or finances.
As previously noted, the C&O was a politically controlled company. In this political environment there existed the potential for political favors to override the stockholder reviews. In 1829, the stockholders established the process for the selection of committee members. The stockholder resolution states that the review committee will be populated with a representative from the States of Virginia and Maryland, the United States, the cities of Alexandria, Washington, and Georgetown, and the balance of members being called from other stockholders in attendance. 4 This stockholder audit practice continued until the company ceased to exist in 1889. The last thirty years of the company's existence, no review committee reports any error or misstatement. A lawsuit brought by the bondholders alleges corporate mismanagement. In the lawsuit the bondholders want the company to be placed into receivership. The court judgment states that there are excessive expenditures for travel and entertainment but that the company should not be placed into receivership. For these reasons one is left to assume that the review committee reviewed transactions to insure that the transactions were correctly documented but that the committee did not review if the transactions were legitimate expenses. A statement made by the review committee in 1837 further illustrates this point. The committee reports that the magnitude of expenses paid and charged to the contingent fund (miscellaneous expense) far exceeded the previous years. After presenting the transactions that represent the greatest amount of these expenses, the committee makes the following statement:
As it did not fall within the legitimate range of duty prescribed to the committee to inquire into the expediency or necessity of these expenditure, they do not express any opinion on the subject. All of them have been authorized by the board of directors, the proper vouchers are on file and the requisitions for their payment have been issued (Stockholder minute book, Volume B, 130). This illustrates the shortcoming of the practices of the C&O review committee.
The practices of the review committee had the shortcoming of not identifying problems relating to magnitude of expenditures, but the committees did reveal and recommend changes in internal control and company reporting practices. The individuals performing these financial reviews were not trained auditors but were still able to recognize problems, recommend changes, and the corporate officers placed the changes into service.
Concluding Comments
In this paper we have provided support for the theoretical framework of corporate governance presented by Hart (1995) by presenting evidence from a 19 th century company, the C&O. In this regard the issues presented by Hart are not considered new, but manifested themselves and were acted upon in an early corporation.
Hart states that agent contracts cannot be comprehensively written. The C&O did not have an employment contract with the president of the company. The stockholders controlled the president's actions by stockholder resolutions at the annual stockholders meetings. As new issues arose, the stockholders passed new resolutions to restrict or control the president.
Hart felt that individual stockholders are too numerous to exert control over the actions of the officers of the company. In the late 1700's, the C&O, one of the first US corporations, established a corporate governance structure similar in many ways to the structure used today. One difference between the C&O structure and modern structure is that modern structures use independent auditors to review the finances of the company. The C&O used a committee consisting of stockholders to perform the audit function, and to review the actions of the president and board of directors.
Hart contends that large stockholders will free ride instead of actively participating in the monitoring of corporate management. In the case of the C&O's largest stockholder, the State of Maryland, participation in corporate management was no greater than the participation of other stockholders even with the State of Maryland's much larger investment to protect. The State of Maryland not only failed to monitor at a level associated with the investment at risk, but allowed company management to pursue political gains at the company expense. Hart (1995) presents four limitations of a board of directors. The presentation in this paper provides support for three of the four limitations, board members may not have a financial interest in the company, board members have little time for company affairs, and directors may owe their position to company management. After the State of Maryland gained controlling interest of the company, the boards of directors of the C&O were selected for political reasons instead of business reasons. For this reason, the board members were not stockholders and had no financial interest in the success of the company, and the board was more loyal to the company president (a fellow political appointee) than to the company stockholders. The actions of the board, while not explored in this paper, were probably more politically motivated than profit motivated for the reasons set forth above.
The last corporate governance issue presented by Hart is that the potential exists for managers to pursue their own interest at the expense of the company. In his paper describing Arthur Gorman as a political party boss, Sanderlin (1947) states that Gorman used his position as president of the C&O for his own political gain. The 1881 bondholder petition provides additional support for the case that the presidents of the C&O used the office for political purposes. As stated, it is felt that Gorman used his position as the company president to assist in his election to the US senate (Sanderlin 1947) . Shleifer and Vishny (1997) state that most advanced market economies have solved the problem of corporate governance at least reasonably well, but this does not mean that the current systems of corporate governance cannot be improved. The issues presented by Hart indicate weaknesses in the corporate governance structure used today. Examples of today's failures provide evidence that improvements could and should be made to our system of corporate governance. Perhaps we have not solved the problems of corporate governance as well as we have thought. In the U.S. more requirements are being made for outside directors to strengthen corporate governance. Maybe we can learn from history and find additional solutions to the corporate governance problem that have been lost in time. In the United States, the distance between managers and providers of capital increases the agency problem (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) . Corporate managers have greater discretionary power over the allocation of corporate resources than might otherwise be if owners were actively involved in corporate management.
In the case of the C&O, the stockholder review committee gave the providers of capital, the stockholders, a more active involvement in corporate management. Since companies that draw on the experience of the stockholders will be more efficient (O'Sullivan 2000) , the stockholder committee utilized by the C&O might very well be utilized in corporate governance today. Sametz (1995) presents evidence of the increased presence of pension funds, investment companies, and insurance companies in stock ownership. Using this, a review committee could be selected from representatives of stockholders holding large blocks of stock (e.g. mutual funds and retirement funds). The committee would then review the decisions of the board of directors and perform analytical review of the financial information provided by the company. A review committee composed in such a manner would not have any allegiance to corporate management and would likely monitor management more closely and with greater scrutiny than the board of directors. This review committee would reduce the free rider issue of large stockholders so that they would monitor management at a level more equivalent to the level of risk represented by the size of the investment. This practice would also reduce the distance between the stockholders and company management.
